American Sanctions against Iran: Practice and Prospects

Gary Sick is Adjunct Professor of International Affairs at Columbia University. He served on the US National Security Council staff under presidents Ford, Carter and Reagan, where he was the principal White House aide for Persian Gulf affairs during the Iranian Revolution and the hostage crisis.

The policy of the United States towards the Islamic Republic of Iran has, almost from the moment of the 1979 revolution, consisted primarily of sanctions. The overthrow of the shah and his replacement by a radical Islamist regime shattered several generations of US strategy that had relied on the stability and co-operation of the Iranian monarchy to sustain US interests in the Persian Gulf. The United States had placed all its eggs in the Iranian basket, and when the basket unravelled there was little choice but to start the entire process over again from scratch. In turn, one of the most enduring legacies of the revolution for the new rulers of Iran was fear and suspicion of the West—especially the United States—leaving little room for diplomacy or compromise.

 

Since Iran no longer figured as a constructive element in US policymaking, and since there was no particular interest on the part of American policymakers to placate or court a regime that seemed bent on nothing but destruction of the existing order and humiliation of its erstwhile superpower ally, US policymakers, with only a few exceptions, adopted towards the new revolutionary government an attitude of hostility, isolation, punishment and vengeance. Sanctions were the least expensive, the most effective and politically the most attractive of the limited range of options available to Washington for dealing with Tehran. For nearly twenty years, the number and scope and severity of sanctions imposed by the United States gradually increased until, at least on paper, there was no longer any possibility of commerce between the two states.¹

The Aftermath of Revolution

From the 1970s to the time of the Iranian Revolution in 1979, the US “two pillar” policy took the form of a strategic alliance with Iran and Saudi Arabia. The alliance with Iran—the stronger of the two pillars—was intended to strengthen Iran in relation to Iraq, as well as making Iran a barrier to Soviet expansion into the Persian Gulf. The policy was predicated on the need for a regional ally to protect US interests at a time when US forces were stretched thinly in South-East Asia. It was also based on the principle of balancing Iran (and to a lesser degree Saudi Arabia) against Iraq, which was seen as the principal regional threat at the time. This policy collapsed totally in 1979 as a result of the Iranian Revolution.

 

After the revolution, and especially as a result of the hostage crisis (November 1979 to January 1981), the United States imposed a variety of sanctions on Iran, including withholding delivery of military equipment, terminating the importation of Iranian oil into the United States (though US companies could continue to buy Iranian oil for sale in other markets), freezing some $12 billion of Iranian assets in US banks, efforts to persuade the international community to take actions against Iran, and eventually the breaking of diplomatic relations and prohibition of trade and all imports from Iran. The economic restrictions were lifted on 19 January 1981, when the Algiers Accords were implemented as part of a package resulting in the release of the American hostages, but the underlying hostility and mistrust continued.

 

By the terms of the Algiers Accords, settlement of claims was transferred to an international arbitration tribunal at The Hague. Over the following years, the claims tribunal settled some four thousand claims by the United States and Iran, involving payments of about $2.5 billion to American claimants and about $900 million to Iranians. By 2000, the major remaining claim involved US management (or mismanagement in Iran’s view) of Iran’s Foreign Military Sales account with the US government prior to and during the revolution. In March 2000, US Secretary of State Madeleine Albright called for a “global settlement” of the remaining legal claims between the two countries, but this has not yet occurred.

 

After the revolution, US efforts to play a balancing role in the Persian Gulf became more improvisational. During the Iran–Iraq War, when it appeared that revolutionary Iran might gain the upper hand, the United States lent covert intelligence support to Iraq and adopted the “Staunch” policy to prevent Iran from buying weapons on the international market. In 1984, the United States imposed anti-terrorism controls on Iran that prohibited the export of aircraft and other items relevant to national security. The sale of chemicals that could be used for manufacturing chemical weapons was prohibited to both Iran and Iraq. Later, when concern about US hostages in Lebanon combined with fears of growing Soviet influence in Iran, the United States co-operated with Israel in the covert sale of arms to Iran—the so-called Iran–Contra affair—which disintegrated into debacle and scandal.

 

In the wake of the Iran–Contra affair, US restrictions against Iran were expanded to include a wide range of equipment that could be used for military purposes. In 1987, executive orders instructed US representatives in international multilateral banks to vote against loans or other financial assistance to Iran, and a ban on the import of Iranian goods and services (especially petroleum products) was re-established, on grounds of Iranian association with terrorism and the international trade in narcotics. After the Iran–Iraq War ended with a cease-fire in August 1988, US sanctions remained in place and the United States pursued a policy of accommodation with Iraq in an effort to bring Saddam Hussein’s government into the Arab mainstream as a secular bulwark against Iranian ambitions and Islamic fundamentalism.

Reconciliation Aborted

President George Bush, who had personally been associated with US policies during the Iran‑Iraq War, was able to say in his Inaugural Address in January 1989, in a clear reference to Iran, “Good will begets good will. Good faith can be a spiral that endlessly moves on.” This was the first high-level indication of a willingness to re-examine US policy towards Iran since the revolution and the failure of the Iran–Contra affair. At the time, a number of US and other hostages were being held in Lebanon by groups associated with Iran, and Bush’s remarks were widely interpreted as a call for Iran to use its leverage with the Lebanese groups in return for improved relations with Washington.

 

Iran never commented on the Bush initiative, but there was ample evidence that his words were taken quite seriously in Tehran. By December 1991, all of the US hostages in Lebanon had been released, and there was no doubt that Iran’s intervention had been crucial, and even costly, in swaying the radical groups in Lebanon. However, by the end of 1991 a lot of things had changed.

 

The US policy of accommodating Saddam Hussein had come to a tragic end with Iraq’s invasion of Kuwait and the second Gulf war. Iran deliberately stayed out of the war and did not attempt to sabotage the massive international coalition that was assembled, a fact that was quietly noted and appreciated in Washington. However, Bush was preparing for his re-election campaign and was vulnerable on the grounds of having relied too much on engagement with Iraq and not enough on showing toughness. Congress was insisting on a tougher policy with nations suspected of terrorism and development of weapons of mass destruction.

 

In July 1989, Israeli commandos kidnapped Hizbollah cleric Sheikh Abdul Karim Obeid from his home in Lebanon, and pro-Iranian kidnappers killed a US military hostage, William Higgins, in retaliation. Then, in February 1992, Israeli helicopter gunships attacked a convoy in south Lebanon, killing Hizbollah leader Sheikh Abbas Musawi, his wife and six-year-old son. The following month, a bomb wrecked the Israeli embassy in Argentina, killing dozens. Islamic Jihad said it carried out the attack to avenge Musawi’s killing, and there was widespread suspicion in the United States and Israel that Iran had provided support for the operation.

 

In October 1992, as the presidential election was approaching, Congress passed the “Iran–Iraq Arms Non-proliferation Act” placing new restrictions on exports to Iran, especially dual-use equipment that could be used for military purposes. President Bush signed the bill under protest, but lost the election. Iranian trade dried up still further.

 

The promise of “good will” had dissipated. President Rafsanjani, who felt that he had taken considerable political risks to remove some of the obstacles to a better relationship with the United States, had nothing to show for his efforts and was publicly embarrassed. Iranian officials would later cite this sequence of events as evidence of the unreliability of the United States and the futility of attempting to repair relations.

Dual Containment

On 18 May 1993, only months after President Clinton had taken office, Martin Indyk of the National Security Council staff outlined the new administration’s “dual containment” policy in the Persian Gulf.² Traditionally, the United States had pursued a policy of balancing Iran or Iraq against the other as a means of maintaining a degree of regional stability and to protect the smaller, oil-rich Arab states on the southern side of the Gulf.

 

Indyk rejected a balancing strategy as unnecessary. Iraq was boxed in by United Nations sanctions, Iran was nearly prostrate after the eight-year war with Iraq, and the United States was the predominant power in the Persian Gulf, with the means to counter both the Iraqi and Iranian regimes. With regard to Iran, the dual containment policy called for changes in Iran’s behaviour in five areas: (1) support of international terrorism; (2) support for Hamas and the attempted sabotage of the Arab–Israeli peace talks; (3) subversion through support of Islamic movements in Sudan and elsewhere; (4) acquisition of conventional weapons that would permit Iran to dominate the Persian Gulf region; and (5) prospective acquisition of weapons of mass destruction.

 

In pursuance of this policy, Indyk said, the United States would attempt to persuade European powers, Japan, Russia and China to reject Iranian requests for weapons of mass destruction and conventional weapons that might constitute a regional threat. The United States would also oppose development loans to Iran by the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund, and would seek to persuade its allies to maintain pressure on Iran so it could not “pursue normal commercial relations”. Iran, he observed, “does not yet face the kind of international regime” of sanctions imposed on Iraq. The word “yet” suggested that such sanctions were potentially on the cards.

 

Although the Indyk speech was indisputably administration policy, some of his original formulations were resisted by the Department of State—in particular the phrase “dual containment”, since it implied that Iran was to be equated with Iraq. Shortly after the policy was announced, the assistant secretary of state for Near East affairs, Edward Djerejian, testifying before a House subcommittee, refined and reordered the areas of US concern with Iran, dropping the objection to conventional weapons purchases and replacing it with concerns about human rights. He specifically denied that the United States would try to hinder Iran’s normal commercial activities; on the contrary, he said, “We do not seek a total embargo or quarantine of Iran.”³

 

Despite this public airing of inter-agency linen, the bottom line remained unchanged and the policy was implemented essentially as Indyk had described. However, the critique seems to have had some effect since the term “dual containment” appeared to be deliberately avoided by the US president and secretary of state.

The ‘Rogue’ State

There was no talk of good will by the Clinton administration. Instead, as part of the dual containment policy, US officials developed a special vocabulary in which Iran was routinely branded as a “rogue”, “terrorist”, “outlaw” or “backlash” state. This relentless drumfire of attacks—the mirror image of Iranian depictions of the United States as the “Great Satan”—had its effects in the media, in Congress, on the public and in the attitudes of lower-level bureaucrats. With Iran clearly identified as public enemy number one, attention shifted away from any consideration of political developments inside Iran, some of which might have been regarded as favourable from the US perspective, to a debate over what was to be done to contain the Iranian threat.

 

With a Democrat in the White House and the Republicans in control of Congress, a contest developed over which political party could be most vigorous in promoting US policies to deal with Iran. The debate was galvanised in 1995 by the announcement by the US oil company Conoco that it had signed a $1 billion contract with Iran to develop the Sirri gas field in the Persian Gulf. Although Conoco’s negotiations with Iran had been under way for years and had been reported to lower-level State Department officials, Conoco did nothing to prepare the White House, Congress, or even, as it turned out, its own parent board of DuPont for this development.

 

The Conoco deal was entirely legal within the context of US law at the time; it was a nearly perfect deal for Conoco, which needed the gas for an unrelated project in nearby Dubai; and Iran obviously intended it as a friendly gesture to the Unite States. Perhaps Conoco believed that would be enough. It was clearly unprepared for the wave of outrage that greeted the announcement. The gas deal was seen as opening a gaping hole in the US containment wall around Iran and as undercutting US efforts to persuade Europeans and others to get tough on Iran.

 

Under intense public pressure, DuPont renounced the deal. Senator Alfonse D’Amato, working closely with the American–Israel Public Affairs Committee (AIPAC), began preparing legislation that would end all trade with Iran and punish any corporations that engaged in investments there. President Clinton, who was preparing for his re-election campaign, quickly pre-empted him by issuing two executive orders that made it illegal for American oil companies to operate in Iran and established penalties for any US person or corporation doing business with Iran. Both decisions were announced by senior administration officials before major Jewish organisations. The US business community, apparently intimidated by the public outcry, remained totally silent.

 

This process was replayed in the presidential election year of 1996. Senator D’Amato prepared a bill in late 1995 that would impose sanctions on any foreign corporation that invested $40 million or more in the Iranian oil and gas sector (a threshold lowered to $20 million after the bill became law). Although the bill was widely, if privately, regarded as an extreme piece of legislation that promised to do more harm than good, the public animus towards Iran, fuelled by the continuing broadsides of the administration, insured significant support in the Senate. The bill slipped through on a voice vote after Senator Edward Kennedy had succeeded in adding Libya to the sanctions regime. Again the Clinton administration chose to endorse the bill—the Iran–Libya Sanctions Act (ILSA)—with some modifications, rather than fight it.

 

In the House of Representatives, vigorous debate over the bill was silenced by the crash of TWA 800 on 16 July 1996, which came shortly after the bombing of the US military barracks at Al-Khobar in Saudi Arabia. Ten days later, a pipebomb exploded during the Olympic games in Atlanta. The TWA crash now appears to have resulted from a mechanical problem, the Atlanta bombing was apparently the work of a US extremist group, and responsibility for the Al-Khobar bombing has yet to be determined; nevertheless, the US Congress saw ILSA as an opportunity to take a public stand against terrorism. The bill passed 415–0 and was signed into law by President Clinton.

 

Thus, a cycle of policy escalation became a familiar element of US strategy towards Iran in the first five years of the Clinton administration. First, the harsh words of the White House and other government departments fanned an atmosphere of fear and distrust in the public and the media. Public attitudes then played back into Congress, which sought to surpass the executive branch in its hostility to Iran. In response, the administration increased its own anti‑Iran actions and rhetoric in order to retain the political initiative, at which point the cycle started again. Even when the administration had doubts about the wisdom of a particular piece of legislation, as it clearly did in the case of ILSA, it preferred to accept bad legislation rather than run the political risk of being seen as softening its posture on Iran. In this environment, it was virtually impossible to conduct a rational discussion about Iran. Even officials who were privately doubtful about the wisdom and effectiveness of the US containment strategy kept their silence rather than risk their jobs in what was certain to be a futile effort to challenge the anti-Iran dogma.

The Effect of Sanctions

The US strategy of sanctions indisputably created political and economic problems for Iran. The drumbeat of the United States’ accusations and its relentless lobbying with friends and allies throughout the world to impose tough restrictions on Iran complicated Iran’s efforts to improve its international image and to develop new bilateral ties, especially with Europe and Japan.

 

The imposition of sanctions on virtually all economic intercourse with Iran also adversely affected Iran’s ability to get its economic house in order. When the two US executive orders were issued in March and May 1995, the exchange rate of the Iranian rial dropped precipitately against the dollar, forcing Iran to institute exchange controls and reduce its foreign trade in order to bring the rate back in line. A number of large oil companies, especially those that had extensive operations in the United States, put their negotiations with Iran on hold while they assessed the potential effects of US sanctions on their own business interests. Iran was denied development loans from the World Bank and the IMF, and Japan was persuaded to withhold credits for a hydroelectric project in southern Iran. Stringent US visa and monetary regulations hindered all aspects of Iranian interaction with the United States, from commercial and professional contacts to family visits and academic exchanges.

 

There has never been any question that the United States, as a global economic superpower, could harass Iran and make its economic life more difficult. The question is whether these tactics either have in the past, or are likely in the future, to produce a change in Iran’s behaviour.

 

As it happens, Iran has undergone a dramatic shift in its politics. Very few observers would conclude that these changes were a response to the US sanctions policy, but the new circumstances inside Iran certainly raise questions about the continuation of that policy.

The Khatami Election

In May 1997 Seyyed Mohammad Khatami was elected to a four-year term as president of Iran in a stunning electoral surprise. Khatami is a cleric and had participated in the establishment of the Islamic government, but only five years earlier he had been forced to resign a cabinet post in the face of charges that he was too “liberal” on crucial issues of cultural tolerance and freedom of expression. Unrepentant, he conducted a grass-roots campaign on the issues of rule of law, civil society and dialogue among competing ideologies. His campaign struck a resonant chord with Iranians, particularly among women and the burgeoning population of young people, many of whom had no memory of the ancien régime. Paired against the well-known speaker of the Majlis (parliament), Ali Akbar Nateq-Nouri, who represented revolutionary orthodoxy, Khatami attracted the largest number of voters in Iranian history and won a decisive victory with 69 per cent of the vote. He carried all of the urban centres in Iran and virtually every province.

 

This election has rightly been described as a second Iranian Revolution, but the ingredients of change had been growing for years. Within the ruling elite, a political reform movement had begun to coalesce around the followers of former president Rafsanjani. This group had fielded a slate of candidates in the Majlis elections of 1996 and made a good showing against the social conservatives. Khatami, however, provided the voice and the programme that galvanised a rather inchoate grouping of technocrats and intellectuals into a mass political movement.

 

The Iranian election was decided almost entirely on the basis of domestic issues. However, from the very beginning, the new president indicated that his electoral themes could and would be extended to the foreign-policy realm. The maiden speech of the new foreign minister at the United Nations set forth Iran’s new foreign-policy themes. In its emphasis on “global civil society”, respect for international law, and its call for a “dialogue of civilisations”, this speech represented a unique vision of international affairs that bore little resemblance to the stiff ideological pronouncements of earlier years.

 

It is a fluke of history that less than sixty days after Khatami took office, the French oil giant Total, together with state-owned partners Gazprom of Russia and Petronas of Malaysia, concluded a $2 billion deal to develop an Iranian gas field. These negotiations, which had been under way since shortly after Conoco had been forced to withdraw in 1995, placed Total and its partners in apparent violation of ILSA, which mandated US sanctions against any company investing more than $20 million in the Iranian oil and gas sector.

 

The European Union and Russia warned that any US attempt to apply sanctions against one of their companies for conducting normal commercial relations with Iran would be challenged, raising the possibility of a trade war. After a lengthy review, reinforced by extensive consultations with US allies in Europe, the Clinton administration in effect put the policy on hold. This was widely viewed as evidence that ILSA was not going to be enforced at the cost of vital relations with some of America’s closest allies.

 

In the following years, a number of other oil companies began to negotiate for deals in the Iranian energy sector, again with no substantial reaction from Washington. ILSA expires in August 2001, and it seems improbable that any US administration will fight to renew it, although there will no doubt be proponents in Congress who will contest the issue.

Signs of Change

The US position has shown significant signs of change since Khatami’s election, and particularly since January 1998, when he addressed the American people via an interview with CNN. In that interview, he addressed the key issues of major concern to the United States:

 

• On terrorism: “Any form of killing of innocent men and women who are not involved in confrontations is terrorism. It must be condemned, and we, in our turn, condemn every form of it in the world.”

 

• On the peace process: “We have declared our opposition to the Middle East peace process, because we believe it will not succeed. At the same time, we have clearly said that we don’t intend to impose our views on others or to stand in their way.”

 

• On weapons of mass destruction: “We are not a nuclear power and do not intend to become one.”

 

In addition, Khatami went as far as any Iranian political figure could go in expressing regret about the 1979–81 hostage crisis, and he pledged that such “unconventional methods” would not and could not be employed in today’s Iran.

 

In response, Secretary of State Albright, in June 1998, spelled out a new US policy calling for the establishment of “a road map leading to normal relations”. Over the following two years, the United States made a series of small but significant gestures to Iran. US officials:

 

• softened their language and no longer referred to Iran as a “rogue” or “outlaw” state;

 

• removed Iran from the narcotics list;

 

• designated the Mojahedin-e Khalq, the exiled Iranian opposition group with military bases in Iraq, as a terrorist organisation. (The group’s multiple front organisations were included in the designation);

 

• co-operated with Iran on the 6+2 talks on Afghanistan at the United Nations;

 

• lifted restrictions on the sale of agricultural and medical goods to Iran;

 

• authorised the sale of spare parts needed to ensure the safety of civilian passenger aircraft previously sold to Iran; and

 

• eased visa regulations for academic exchanges and for travel by Iranian UN diplomats in the United States.

 

Following the February 2000 elections for the sixth Majlis in Iran, which resulted in an overwhelming popular vote for candidates supporting Khatami’s reform movement, Secretary Albright again addressed the issue of Iran. She acknowledged the US role in the countercoup that overthrew Prime Minister Mohammad Mossadeq in 1953 and commented that “the United States must bear its fair share of responsibility for the problems that have arisen in U.S.–Iranian relations”. She further acknowledged that “aspects of U.S. policy towards Iraq during its conflict with Iran appear now to have been regrettably short-sighted”. While reiterating US grievances towards Iran, she welcomed the prospect of “regional discussions aimed at reducing tensions and building trust”. She announced the lifting of US sanctions on the purchase of Iranian carpets and food products, such as caviar and pistachios; promised to remove travel and other impediments to the operation of exchange programmes and non-governmental organisations; and, as mentioned above, vowed to increase efforts to conclude a global settlement of all outstanding legal claims. Reiterating US willingness to enter into direct official discussions without pre-conditions, she added, “Surely the time has come for America and Iran to enter a new season in which mutual trust may grow and a quality of warmth supplant the long cold winter of our mutual discontent.”⁴

 

This was the most far-reaching expression of US interest in a rapprochement with Iran in the twenty-one years since the revolution. It came, however, at a moment of intense political conflict in Iran. Conservative forces were striking back at the reformists, closing many newspapers, throwing key journalists into jail and attempting to assassinate Said Hajjarian, a member of the Tehran Municipal Council and one of the architects of the reform movement.

 

Iran’s supreme leader, Ayatollah Mohammad Ali Khamenei, was reportedly offended by a phrase in Albright’s speech referring to the fact that many of Iran’s institutions remained in the hands of “unelected” officials. He made a scathing attack on the US position in a speech in Mashhad on 25 March, and Iran’s official response to the Albright speech was muted and tended to fall back on the formulas of the past.

 

Remarkably, however, less than two weeks later an important reformist organisation published an alternative analysis of the Albright speech. Without reference to the Khamenei address, the Organisation of the Mojahedin of the Islamic Revolution of Iran (Omir), which was closely associated with Behzad Nabavi, a key supporter of President Khatami in the sixth Majlis, praised the candour of Albright’s speech and concluded that it was “a kind of victory and an achievement for … Khatami’s government”. In a clear reference to the US call for direct talks, the Omir declaration asked Iranian policymakers “to carry out a logical, calculated and wise analysis of the changes that have come about in American stances and policies. Instead of relying upon a wave of blind emotions, they must act on the basis of national interests”.⁵

 

Thus, although the Albright speech and the Iranian response could not be seen as a breakthrough, they were evidence of substantially changed attitudes in Washington and in some important circles in Tehran. Unlike during the “dual containment” policy of the previous six years, after 1998 the United States deliberately began to make an explicit distinction between Iran, where it sought dialogue and eventual normalisation of relations, as opposed to Iraq, where regime change was the objective.

The Future of Sanctions

The US unilateral sanctions regime is showing signs of erosion. The new international image of Iran as a democratising country that is attempting to move away from self-destructive radicalism towards becoming a more normal state has influenced wide swathes of opinion in its neighbours, in the United States and in the international community more generally. Other countries are increasingly inclined to ignore US unilateral opposition to normalisation. Britain has opened an official dialogue with Iran on some of the most sensitive political issues. Relations between Iran and Saudi Arabia are more cordial than at any time since the revolution. Even the World Bank disregarded US pressure and approved loans for two long-standing Iranian development projects in May 2000, citing the promising direction of Iran’s political reforms.

 

The selective removal of US restrictions on agricultural and some other items, the failure to enforce the ILSA restrictions in the face of allied objections, and a general softening of regulations that inhibited trade and contact with Iran, all suggest that a trend is slowly developing to reconsider the extensive use of unilateral sanctions. There is also some momentum in Congress, especially among representatives of states with major agricultural and energy interests, to question the efficacy of the policy.

 

Nevertheless, the major US restrictions on trade are still firmly in place and enjoy considerable support both within the administration and on Capitol Hill. Israel and its supporters in the United States remain generally opposed to any additional changes in US policy in the absence of movement on the Iranian side. Sanctions on dual-use equipment that could be used for missiles and/or weapons of mass destruction will remain in place for the foreseeable future, regardless of political developments. It is unlikely that the United States will make any more major concessions or fundamental changes in its sanctions policy during the presidential election year, unless there is some new initiative by Iran.

 

Thus, the next move in this process is up to Iran. The implacable opposition to any opening to the United States by Ayatollah Khamenei and the conservative leadership in Tehran represents an obstacle that will not easily be overcome. There is support for more open relations with the United States among the reformist elements that now control the executive and the legislature, but this is a fairly low priority as compared to their dominant economic and social agenda.

 

The United States will have a new president and a new Congress in January 2001, and there will presumably be a formal review of US policy in the Persian Gulf. In August 2001, ILSA will expire and there will no doubt be a debate about the future of US unilateral sanctions centred on that event.

 

The outcome of these events is unpredictable. However, with a new and more activist Majlis in Iran, political developments in Washington could provide an occasion for Tehran to take a fresh look at its relations with the “Great Satan”. After more than twenty years of utter hostility, which has been immensely costly to both countries, such a review by both capitals would appear to be overdue.

Endnotes

1. For a comprehensive survey and analysis of US sanctions against Iran, see Hossein Alikhani, Sanctioning Iran: Anatomy of a Failed Policy (London: I. B. Tauris, 2000). Another useful compendium on this subject is Kenneth Katzman, US–Iranian Relations: An Analytic Compendium of US Policies, Laws and Regulations (Washington, D.C.: Atlantic Council of the United States, Occasional Paper, December 1999). Some of the documentation and analysis in the present article has been adapted from Gary Sick, “Rethinking Dual Containment”, Survival: The IISS Quarterly 40, no. 1 (spring 1998), pp. 5‑32.

 

2. Martin Indyk, “The Clinton Administration’s Approach to the Middle East”, keynote address to the Soref Symposium on “Challenges to US Interests in the Middle East: Obstacles and Opportunities”, Proceedings of the Washington Institute for Near East Policy (18–19 May 1993), pp. 1–8. Martin Indyk at the time of this speech had just joined the National Security Council staff. He later became the US ambassador to Israel, then the assistant secretary of state for Near East affairs, and then again ambassador to Israel.

 

3. Hearing of the Europe and Middle East Subcommittee of the House Foreign Affairs Committee, 27 July 1993, Federal News Service.

 

4. Madeleine Albright, speech to the American–Iranian Council, Omni Shoreham Hotel, Washington, D.C., 17 March 2000.

 

5. Declaration of the Organisation of the Mojahedin of the Islamic Revolution of Iran, 4 April 2000, published in Asr-e Ma, no. 156 (6 April 2000), pp. 1, 6, 8. Translated by the Foreign Broadcast Information Service.