Understanding this process is not easy, not only because of the complexity of the issues themselves, but also because even the most basic facts have been distorted or concealed to enable interested parties to put their preferred spin on events. The demonisation of the Serbs, which took place during the 1990s, is an example of this. It facilitated the illegal war to be waged upon Yugoslavia in 1999 because by that point the majority even of educated opinion believed the Serbs to be engaged in, or on the verge of committing, genocide, without any evidence at all.

In Western governmental circles, two views on the reasons for the disintegration of Yugoslavia could be identified. The first was that the break-up was the result of a pattern of Serbian aggression, from Slovenia and Croatia through to Bosnia-Herzegovina, with the purpose of creating a Greater Serbia. This perspective originated among the leaders of Austria, Slovenia, Croatia and eventually Germany. The United States government then adopted this approach and made it part of its wider post–Cold War geostrategic analysis of “rogue states” and “evil” leaders like Slobodan Milosevic and Saddam Hussein whose crimes justified intervention and regime change. Following the March 2003 US-led invasion of Iraq, it is easy to trace the pattern from Yugoslavia to Iraq: illegal war on trumped-up charges, the notion of “humanitarian war” and the moral obligation to effect regime change irrespective of international law, and the impulse to change international law to make such intervention legal.

The second view was that the Yugoslav crisis was a civil war based on the re-emergence of ethnic conflict in the post-communist period—that with the end of communist suppression, the lid had been lifted and “history” had reasserted itself. That history was believed to have been one of ethnic hostility and conflict. This view was more popular in Europe and Canada than in the United States, although it did have some support there as well.

Both of these views are erroneous, and it is to the great credit of Raju Thomas’s edited collection that, while some of the chapters nod excessively to the latter interpretation, on the whole it rejects narrow conformity to any framework. The book helps the reader to understand both the realities of the unravelling Yugoslavia and just why governments—and those who manufacture ideas and explanations on their behalf—have put so much time and effort into presenting an altered reality.

Yugoslavia Unraveled is divided into two parts: the first looks at “Nations, States, and Nationalism”, and the second at “Wars, War Crimes and International Law”. Thomas opens the first section with an incisive chapter on “Sovereignty, Self-Determination, and Secession”, in which he explains the unravelling of Yugoslavia as the result primarily of “a selective and prejudicial international recognition policy of its internal ‘republics’ ” (p. 3). The main weakness of this chapter, which is not rectified by other contributions, is to equate the goals of Croatian nationalism and Serbian nationalism under Franjo Tudjman and Milosevic respectively. Indeed, Thomas remarks that “Milosevic and the Serbian nationalists attempted to secede from Yugoslavia with a Greater Serbia through force from mid-1991 onward” (p. 13), which is not the case. In fact, as Norah Beloff has pointed out elsewhere, Milosevic never used the words “Greater Serbia” except to deny accusations by outside powers that he aspired to create such an entity. The real danger lay with the development of an exclusive ethnic nationalism in Croatia, which proclaimed “Croatia for the Croats” and stripped the large Serbian communities of their constitutional rights.

To understand correctly the role of the Serbs and not just reduce them to an equivalent barbaric nationalism, it is necessary to understand the constitutional issue. The Serbs were the largest of the six constituent nations of Yugoslavia. These were the six officially recognised groups with national homes in one of the federal republics: Serbs, Croats, Slovenes, Montenegrins, Macedonians and Muslims. The right to self-determination of all nations—defined as peoples, not territorially—was guaranteed by the constitution, irrespective of the republic in which they resided. While the federation existed, their rights were ensured, but once Croatia and Bosnia declared independence, the right to self-determination of the Serbs was unconstitutionally withdrawn. They found themselves, without their consent, in the case of Croatia, living in a state in which they did not have full citizenship rights. In May 1991, a vote in the Serb-inhabited areas of Croatia supported secession. These areas declared themselves an autonomous region and opted to remain within Yugoslavia.

The Serbs were not alone in understanding the implications of the break-up and there was much under-reported opposition to it. Initially Bosnia, Macedonia and Montenegro also opposed the break-up because of the risks it posed of irredentism and inter-ethnic conflict. With tragic consequences, President Alija Izetbegovic of Bosnia seems eventually to have been persuaded by US representatives to opt for independence instead. In Bosnia also, the Serbs were opposed to leaving Yugoslavia. In November 1991, the Bosnian Serbs held a referendum in which the vote was overwhelmingly against independence from Yugoslavia. Thus, when Izetbegovic declared Bosnian independence in March 1992—even though constitutionally the agreement of all three of the republic’s communities, Serbs, Croats and Muslims, was required—Bosnian Serbs declared the Republika Srpska. International recognition of Bosnia ensured that war would take place.

Other chapters in this section include Michael Mandelbaum on “The Future of Nationalisms”, Alan J. Kuperman on “Transnational Causes of Genocide: Or How the West Inadvertently Exacerbates Ethnic Conflict”, P. H. Liotta on “Religion and War: Fault Lines in the Balkan Enigma”, Milica Z. Bookman on “Economic Aspects of Yugoslavia’s Disintegration”, and Gordon N. Bardos on “International Policy in Southeastern Europe”. While all these chapters include interesting elements, there is an overemphasis on an “ethnic” interpretation of events. The main warring parties through most of the 1990s were ethnically identical—Serbs, Croats and Bosnian Muslims, the last being Slav converts to Islam. Corresponding to this overemphasis is an underemphasis on fundamental economic factors which contributed to tension and hostility between the republics.

Milica Z. Bookman touches on important questions in her chapter on economic aspects of the disintegration, but a more in-depth study of the changing context set by the 1980s would be extremely helpful. First, Western institutions gained leverage over the Yugoslav economy in the 1980s because of the country’s growing indebtedness, and second, capitalism was reintroduced into eastern Europe and the Soviet Union dissolved at the turn of the decade. The first factor resulted in the imposition of increasingly harsh economic pressures on Yugoslavia, which exacerbated internal divisions. The second rendered worthless the strategic significance of Yugoslavia’s neutralist Cold War stance, and both the United States and Germany moved to eliminate non-capitalist Yugoslavia. The United States initially inclined towards creating a pro-capitalist federal government, whereas Germany fostered separatism in Croatia and Slovenia to break-up the federation.

Changing US policy towards Yugoslavia in the 1980s included efforts to promote the overthrow of communist rule and the country’s reintegration into the world market. International Monetary Fund–sponsored programmes of liberal macro-economic reform led to austerity and a deterioration in living standards. By 1990, industrial production had fallen by 10 per cent and GDP by 7.5 per cent. The terms that were required by the IMF were designed to secure the privatisation and dismantling of the public sector in Yugoslavia. In January 1990, a policy of economic shock therapy was introduced by Yugoslavia’s pro-US federal leader, Ante Markovic. The political impact of this was profound, not least because federal-state servicing of Yugoslavia’s debt reduced the resources available to the republics, thus massively increasing tensions within the federation.

The federal republics responded to the crisis of the 1980s in different ways. In the two richest republics, Slovenia and Croatia, political forces that stood for the deepening of free-market policies came to the fore. They began to pursue secession from Yugoslavia in order no longer to have to subsidise the poorer parts of the federation. They sought rapid integration into the German and Austrian economic zone to their north, and in June 1991 they proclaimed their independence from the federal republic and orientated themselves towards the West. In December 1991, Germany began the re-Balkanisation of the country by recognising their independence.

The second section of the book focuses on the theme of war crimes and international law. Chapters include Raju G. C. Thomas on “Wars, Humanitarian Intervention and International Law”, Kelly M. Greenhill on “The Use of Refugees as Political and Military Weapons in the Kosovo Conflict”, Edward S. Herman on “Propaganda System One: From Diem and Arbenz to Milosevic”, Robert M. Hayden on “Biased Justice: ‘Humanrightsism’ and the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia”, Michael Mandel on “Illegal Wars, Collateral Damage and International Criminal Law”, Maya Chadda on “Intervention in Ethnic Civil Wars and Exit Strategies: Lessons from South Asia”, and Satish Nambiar on “Reflections on the Yugoslav Wars: A Peacekeeper’s Perspective”.

There is much to commend in each chapter, but those by Hayden and Mandel stand out for the clarity of their analysis and the light they shed on a number of significant issues: the abuse of international law; the victors’ justice of the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia; the sham of humanitarian intervention; and the shocking way in which the Rambouillet talks were used to force the Yugoslavs into a situation where they could be attacked with impunity in a conflict characterised by NATO war crimes and the infliction of “collateral damage”.

The final chapter is by Satish Nambiar, an Indian general who was the first commander of the UN Protection Force (UNPROFOR) deployed in Yugoslavia. His comments on the UN operation in Yugoslavia, and on UN relations with the European Community, NATO and the aid agencies, are illuminating. Nambiar observes not only that the United Nations became “a facade for the machinations of some members of the NATO grouping” (p. 356), but also that, tragically, it was given tasks to do without adequate resources being made available. He cites the example of the security of the “safe havens”, and notes “the disastrous results of the callousness displayed by the Security Council” (ibid.) in this regard.

Anyone seeking to understand the dismemberment of the former Yugoslavia will find ample reward in this collection. While it could have been strengthened in the areas indicated above, it is nevertheless a worthy contribution to scholarship and to the unearthing of truth in a highly contested political field. Raju G. C. Thomas is to be thanked for bringing these contributions together.